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"DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL": NEGLIGENT HIRING LAW
IN VIRGINIA AND THE NECESSITY OF LEGISLATION
TO PROTECT EX-CONVICTS FROM EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, one in every thirty-two adults was either incarcerated,
on probation, or on parole.' Federal and state prisons and local
jails held 2,193,798 prisoners at the end of that year. 2 An esti-
mated ninety-five percent of those individuals held in federal or
state prisons will eventually be released,3 at a current rate of
over 630,000 people each year,4 and innumerable others will
leave local jails and return to their communities. Virginia's pris-
oner reentry statistics are consistent with national trends, and
the numbers are constantly increasing.5 In 2005, 11,855 indi-
viduals were released from institutions in Virginia alone.6
The general public must be prepared to aid the flood of ex-
prisoners with their reentry into society. One major reason to
support released prisoners is the maintenance of public safety by
1. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Corrections Statistics, http:/!
www.ojp.gov/bjs/correct.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
2. Id.
3. NANCY G. LAVIGNE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONER REENTRY AND
COMMUNITY POLICING: STRATEGIES FOR ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY 3 (2006), available at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1701.
4. NATIONAL HIRE NETWORK, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS THAT ENCOURAGE THE EM-
PLOYMENT OF QUALIFIED PEOPLE [WITH] CRIMINAL HISTORIES 1 (2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/employmentstdssumary.pdf [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT STAN-
DARDS] (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft Announces
Nationwide Effort to Reintegrate Offenders Back into Communities (July 15, 2002), http:/l
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/2002/0JP02214.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2007)).
5. See SINEAD KEEGAN & AMY L. SOLOMON, URBAN INSTITUTE, PRISONER REENTRY IN
VIRGINIA 1 (2004), available at http://www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/411174-Prisoner-Re
entryVA.pdf. Between 1980 and 2002, the per capita rate of imprisonment in Virginia
increased by almost 200%, from 159 to 471 per 100,000 residents. Id.
6. STATISTICAL SUMMARY FY 2005, VA. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS 2 (2006), available at
http://www.vadoc.virginia.gov/about/facts/research/new-statsum/fy05statsummary.pdf
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reducing recidivism. An extensive recidivism study tracked
272,111 prisoners released in 1994 from institutions in fifteen
states, including Virginia. 7 Approximately sixty-seven percent of
those former prisoners were rearrested for a serious new crime
within three years.' Almost thirty percent were rearrested on fel-
ony or serious misdemeanor charges within the first six months of
their release.9 Indeed, "it is well documented that the majority of
released prisoners will reoffend and contribute to a substantial
share of crime.,10
Undoubtedly, many of those who recidivated sought to become
productive members of society but ran into societal roadblocks."
The likelihood of rehabilitation decreases and ex-convicts often
fall back into a pattern of crime if they are unable to obtain em-
ployment or are otherwise discriminated against because of their
status as ex-offenders.12 Removing the roadblocks to rehabilita-
tion is in society's best interest. As the National Employment
Law Project explained in its comments to the United States At-
torney General in August 2005, "a broad consensus has also de-
veloped among policy makers, criminal justice professionals, and
communities hit hard by crime, that far more should be done to
reduce recidivism-and thereby increase public safety-by creat-
ing job opportunities for the record numbers of people leaving
prison. " "
7. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 1 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
rpr94.pdf.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3.
10. LAVIGNE ET AL., supra note 3, at 8.
11. See Joe Graffam et al., Variables Affecting Successful Reintegration as Perceived
by Offenders and Professionals, 40 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 147, 148-49 (2004) ("A
person who has a criminal record faces a multitude of barriers that may affect his or her
successful reintegration into the community .... including stigmatization and discrimina-
tion toward ex-offenders, loss of social standing in the community, fear and hostility
among the general community, and a tendency to enquire about and reject applications for
housing, employment, and further education."); see, e.g., Tom Beyerlein & Kelli Wynn,
Task Force on Leading Edge of State, National Efforts to Help Ex-Convicts, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 11, 2007, at A10 (profiling an ex-convict unable to find employment because
when employers learn of his criminal history they "won't give [him] the time of day").
12. See Jennifer Leavitt, Note, Walking a Tightrope: Balancing Competing Public In-
terests in the Employment of Criminal Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (2002) (ex-
plaining that while employment opportunities for ex-convicts can decrease recidivism
among ex-offenders, the stigmas that potential employers associate with ex-convicts make
obtaining employment difficult).
13. NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING FOR CRIMINAL
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Employers are in a prime position to help reduce recidivism,
because "[t]he temptation for recidivism increases when an ex-
convict cannot obtain employment." 4 However, employers often
find themselves stuck between a rock and a hard place when it
comes to hiring ex-convicts. Employers may automatically dis-
criminate against a prospective employee with a criminal record
because of the stigma attached to ex-convicts and a concern about
being exposed to liability for negligent hiring.l" That practice may
lead to increased recidivism rates. At the same time, however,
employers who exercise a "don't ask, don't tell" philosophy regard-
ing employees' criminal conviction backgrounds may unknow-
ingly hire an ex-convict who poses a threat to the public because
of the particular position for which he or she is hired. Both poten-
tial situations are adverse to the strong public interest in main-
taining public safety. In Virginia, one of the main reasons for this
vicious cycle is the ambiguous nature of the tort of negligent hir-
ing, which in some cases can perpetuate discrimination against
ex-convicts in employment, thus increasing the likelihood of re-
cidivism.
The difficulties facing ex-convicts in obtaining employment be-
cause of employers' attitudes are not a myth. A 2001 survey of
over 600 employers in Los Angeles County found that "over 40
percent of employers indicated that they would 'probably' or 'defi-
nitely' not be willing to hire an applicant with a criminal record
for a job not requiring a college degree." 6 The authors of the sur-
vey explain some factors that may contribute to the employers'
hesitation to hire applicants with criminal histories:
RECORDS: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS 3 (2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/agcommentsnelp.pdf.
14. James R. Todd, Comment, "It's Not My Problem": How Workplace Violence and
Potential Employer Liability Lead to Employment Discrimination of Ex-Convicts, 36 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 725, 727 (2004); see Haddock v. City of New York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 992 (N.Y. 1990)
("[Tihe opportunity for gainful employment may spell the difference between recidivism
and rehabilitation."); Virginia Performs, Public Safety, Recidivism (Adult & Juvenile),
http://vaperforms.virginia.gov/i-recidivism.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2007) ("[E]mployment
strongly influence[s] whether or not offenders recidivate.")).
15. Elizabeth A. Gerlach, Comment, The Background Check Balancing Act: Protecting
Applicants with Criminal Convictions While Encouraging Criminal Background Checks in
Hiring, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 981, 981 (2006).
16. Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael, & Michael A. Stoll, How Willing are Employers
to Hire Ex-Offenders?, FOCUS, Summer 2004, at 40, 41 (emphasis added), available at
http://www. irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc232h.pdf.
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For employers, a criminal history may signal an untrustworthy em-
ployee who may break rules, steal, or deal poorly with customers.
Employers' reluctance to hire such individuals may be prompted by
law or by fear of litigation .... [E]mployers may be legally liable for
the crimes committed by employees and so be wary of hiring those
who already have a record. 17
Employers' fears are not always unfounded-in fact, those
fears are supported in some circumstances by the strong interest
in protecting third parties who may have close contact with em-
ployees. However, public safety is also well served when ex-
convicts are able to rehabilitate through employment, thereby de-
creasing the likelihood they will recidivate. This public safety in-
terest cannot be realized if employers continue to discriminate
against applicants with criminal convictions. The overarching
goal of preserving public safety can be achieved by striking a bal-
ance between the interests of ex-convicts and the interests of em-
ployers.
Part II of this Comment will discuss both state and federal leg-
islation designed to protect ex-convicts against discriminatory
employment practices. Specifically, this section will discuss Con-
necticut and New York state laws,'8 as well as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.19 The state statutes prohibit employers
from discriminating against a candidate solely on the basis of a
criminal conviction. 20 Both states require an employer to make an
individualized assessment of an applicant with a criminal record
based on certain factors. 2' As a result, the employer can be pro-
tected against negligent hiring liability when it investigates an
applicant's background and makes an informed decision based on
the factors delineated in the statute. In addition, public safety is
better promoted when employers have an incentive to investigate
applicants' backgrounds.
Title VII, on the other hand, does not designate ex-convicts as a
protected class. 22 However, an ex-convict can prevail in a Title
VII claim if he or she can show that a particular employment
17. Id.
18. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-79 (West 2004); N.Y. CORRECT. LAw § 752 (Con-
sol. 2005).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to -17 (2000).
20. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-80(a); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752.
21. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-80(b); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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practice had a disparate impact on a protected class, provided
that the employer cannot show that the practice served a busi-
ness necessity. 23 Still, the burden on plaintiffs in Title VII claims
is high, and Title VII does not provide sufficient protection to ex-
convicts in states like Virginia that lack their own anti-
discrimination legislation.24
Part III will begin a discussion of the tort of negligent hiring by
outlining the momentous Supreme Court of Minnesota case, Pon-
ticas v. KM.S. Investments.25 Ponticas is an ideal negligent hiring
case because, unlike relevant Virginia case law, it explains every
aspect of liability and thus provides useful guidelines for employ-
ers. 26 Notably, the Minnesota court's foreseeability standard is
not the deciding factor of the outcome, as it is in most Virginia
negligent hiring cases. 27 The court also describes the appropriate
scope of a "reasonable investigation" of a potential employee's
background and describes how employers should analyze the re-
sults of such an investigation with respect to the risk of harm to
third parties.28
Part IV will examine negligent hiring law in Virginia by dis-
cussing several Virginia cases and their predictable results.29
Few cases in Virginia have held employers liable for negligent
hiring,3 ° but that fact does not seem to encourage employers to
hire potential employees with criminal records. Virginia provides
insufficient standards for employers to consider during the hiring
of those individuals, which makes them more likely to discrimi-
nate solely on the basis of criminal conviction.3 This trend is con-
23. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
25. 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
26. See discussion infra Part III.B.1-2.
27. See discussion infra Part III.B.1; Part W.A.
28. See Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 912-13.
29. The separate tort of negligent retention is beyond the scope of this Comment.
However, many of the principles discussed regarding negligent hiring law can be applied
to negligent retention. See Se. Apartments Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 513 S.E.2d 395, 397
(Va. 1999) (noting that the tort of negligent retention is "based on the principle that an
employer .. .is subject to liability for harm resulting from the employer's negligence in
retaining a dangerous employee who the employer knew or should have known was dan-
gerous").
30. See, e.g., J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394 (Va. 1988);
Davis v. Merrill, 112 S.E. 628, 632 (Va. 1922).
31. Virginia law does regulate the hiring practices of certain employers, such as li-
censed nursing homes and day care facilities, by requiring them to perform a criminal his-
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trary to public policy, which "favors the reintegration of ex-
convicts into society, thereby reducing the likelihood of recidi-
vism.""
Part V will argue that Virginia should adopt legislation de-
signed to end the cycle of workplace discrimination against ex-
convicts by providing employers with specific guidelines and fac-
tors to consider in investigating and analyzing prospective em-
ployees' criminal backgrounds. If employers engage in individual-
ized assessments of applicants and make informed hiring
decisions, a win-win situation is created, whereby the public pol-
icy of helping rehabilitate ex-offenders is promoted, and the em-
ployer is less likely to be exposed to liability for negligently hiring
ex-convicts.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
A. State Statutes Prohibiting Discrimination Against Ex-Convicts
in Employment Practices
As of August 2005, fourteen states had statutes prohibiting
discrimination against ex-convicts by public employers, and five
of those states also include protection for private employment.33
Virginia has no such statute.
The statutes for those fourteen states vary in their elements
and requirements, but "[m]ost require employers to consider
whether there is a rational, reasonable, direct or substantial rela-
tionship between the crime for which the applicant was convicted
and the work he or she wishes to perform."34 This requirement is
sensible because it "not only promote[s] the safety of the general
public and the welfare of the person leaving prison, but assist[s]
employers by providing guidance that allows for informed hiring
tory record check of applicants through the Central Criminal Records Exchange. The law
prohibits these employers from hiring individuals who have committed an offense listed in
the statute. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-126.01, 63.2-1719, -1720 (2006).
32. Todd, supra note 14, at 726.
33. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 2. The states that prohibit discrimina-
tion in public employment are Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Washington; the states that prohibit discrimination in
public and private employment are Hawaii, Kansas, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wis-
consin. Id. at 3-6.
34. Id. at 2.
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or licensing decisions."35 It is important to note, however, that
none of these states force employers to hire ex-convicts.3" Instead,
they require "that employers only consider convictions that are
somehow related to the work the applicant would conduct."3 7 In
states like Virginia, which do not have an anti-discrimination
statute, employers are more likely to eliminate applicants based
solely on the fact that they have some kind of conviction on their
record, without regard for the type of work involved.
1. Connecticut's Anti-Discrimination Statute
Connecticut prohibits discrimination against ex-convicts by
public, but not private, employers. The Connecticut statute first
recognizes that "the public is best protected when criminal of-
fenders are rehabilitated and returned to society prepared to take
their places as productive citizens and that the ability of returned
offenders to find meaningful employment is directly related to
their normal functioning in the community."3" Accordingly, Con-
necticut's policy is "to encourage all employers to give favorable
consideration to providing jobs to qualified individuals, including
those who may have criminal conviction records."39
The Connecticut statute provides, "[A] person shall not be dis-
qualified from employment by the state of Connecticut or any of
its agencies ... solely because of a prior conviction of a crime."40
The statute then describes three factors a public employer must
consider before it can deny employment based on a prior convic-
tion: (1) the relationship between the nature of the crime and the
position sought; (2) information about the person's post-conviction
rehabilitation; and (3) the amount of time that has elapsed since
the conviction or release. 1 Although this list is "not exhaustive,
[it] serves as a guide to state employers as they decide the extent
35. Id. at 1. Specifically, the statutes "instruct employers how to consider the rele-
vance of the criminal history when the applicant is otherwise qualified for the position."
Id. at 2.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id.
38. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-79 (West 2004).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 46a-80(a).
41. Id. § 46a-80(b).
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to which criminal histories may be used in employment deci-
sions. ""
However, the law's omission of ex-convict protection in private
employment gives it a limited scope. Private employers, who are
not touched by the statute, can refuse to hire solely on the basis
of a prior conviction. Connecticut's statute could also be improved
with a more detailed statutory scheme, which would force em-
ployers to consider more than just the three factors listed. This
would ensure that potential employees with prior convictions re-
ceive a comprehensive, individualized assessment before being re-
jected from an employment position. Still, the existence of Con-
necticut's statute reflects the state's efforts to both guide
employers and protect ex-convicts during the hiring process.
2. New York's Anti-Discrimination Statute
New York's anti-discrimination statute, which applies to both
public and private employers,43 provides a more thorough and ex-
tensive set of guidelines for employers. It first states:
No application for any license or employment... shall be denied by
reason of the applicant's having been previously convicted of one or
more criminal offenses, or by reason of a finding of lack of "good
moral character" when such finding is based upon the fact that the
applicant has previously been convicted of one or more criminal of-
fenses. 44
However, the statute is not absolute; it provides employers
with two exceptions. The first exempts employers who can prove
that "there is a direct relationship between one or more of the
previous criminal offenses and the specific license or employment
sought."4' The second exception allows an employer to reject an
applicant if "the issuance of the license or the granting of the em-
ployment would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to
42. Leavitt, supra note 12, at 1292.
43. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 751 (Consol. 2005).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 752(1). The statute defines a "direct relationship" as one in which "the nature
of criminal conduct for which the person was convicted has a direct bearing on his fitness
or ability to perform one or more of the duties or responsibilities necessarily related to the
license or employment sought." Id. § 750(3).
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the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general pub-
lic."46
The New York law provides lucid guidelines for employers by
outlining factors they must consider when determining whether a
direct relationship or unreasonable risk exists. The factors in-
clude: (a) New York's public policy of encouraging employment of
ex-convicts; (b) the particular duties and responsibilities of the
job; (c) the effect that the offense(s) have on the applicant's fitness
for the job; (d) the amount of time that has elapsed since the of-
fense(s); (e) the age of the applicant at the time of the offense(s);
(f) the seriousness of the offense(s); (g) any information produced
by the applicant regarding his rehabilitation and good conduct;
and (h) the legitimate interest of the employer in protecting pub-
lic safety.47
In Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Service Commission,4" a
New York court applied both the direct relationship and unrea-
sonable risk exceptions when it considered whether the New York
City Housing Authority should have denied an ex-convict em-
ployment in a "housing caretaker position."49 The court decided
that the tasks involved with the position, which included "sweep-
ing and mopping public building spaces; spreading sand and salt;
[and] washing windows," were not directly related to the em-
ployee's manslaughter conviction nine years before, and did not
"present an unreasonable risk to persons or property."5 ° Specifi-
cally, the court reasoned that because the housing caretaker posi-
tion "would not as such involve [the employee] in violent confron-
tations and obviously does not require [him] to carry arms, his
46. Id. § 752(2).
47. Id. § 753. For a third example of a state anti-discrimination statute, see MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 364.03 (West 2004). Similar to New York's law, Minnesota requires that em-
ployers consider whether a direct relationship exists between the conviction and the posi-
tion sought. Minnesota's statute, however, outlines only three factors for making that de-
termination: (a) "The nature and seriousness of the crime"; (b) "The relationship of the
crime . . . to the purposes of regulating the position ... sought"; and (c) "The relationship
of the crime ... to the ability, capacity, and fitness required to perform the duties." Id. In
addition to these three factors, Minnesota allows but does not require an employer to con-
sider information such as the circumstances surrounding the crime, the age of the person
at the time, and the length of time elapsed since the crime was committed. Id. Minnesota's
statute also includes a provision allowing evidence of rehabilitation to act as an exception
to the direct relationship test. Id.
48. 713 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
49. Id. at 677.
50. Id. at 678.
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fitness to perform these duties is not implicated," as it would be if
the employment position sought were that of a corrections offi-
cer.51 The court "[w]eigh[ed] the public policy in favor of employ-
ing ex-offenders against the other factors as the statute requires,"
and concluded that "the city's refusal to hire [the ex-offender] ...
would have been unlawful."52 Soto-Lopez provides an excellent
example of the application of the New York statute.
The comprehensive set of factors delineated in the New York
statute is undoubtedly beneficial to employers and potential em-
ployees alike. These factors are helpful to employers because if
they conduct individual evaluations of applicants, they "will not
be found in breach of a duty."53 The statute assists ex-convicts be-
cause it prohibits employers from discriminating against poten-
tial employees based on their status, which simultaneously en-
courages employers to conduct criminal background checks.
Because the employer must be able to justify exclusion of an ex-
convict from a position by using one of the two exceptions, they
have an incentive "to make informed hiring decisions using all
available information without fear of potential liability."54 New
York's extensive law is unmatched by any other state, and illus-
trates the guidance and specificity necessary to protect against
ex-convict discrimination while still encouraging the employer to
protect public safety.
B. Federal Protection? Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and Disparate Impact Analysis
In the absence of state legislation prohibiting employers from
discriminating against job applicants based on criminal convic-
tions, ex-convicts in Virginia are forced to rely on the federal gov-
ernment for protection. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employers from discriminating against certain classes of
51. Id. at 679.
52. Id. At the time he applied for the position, the ex-convict's probation was com-
plete, and his conviction was nine years old. Id.
53. Todd, supra note 14, at 737.
54. Id. But see Haddock v. City of New York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 992 (N.Y. 1990) (stating
that even the "worthy objective" of "employing former inmates, and reintegrating them
into society," will not "excuse a municipal employer from compliance with its own proce-
dures requiring informed discretion in the placement of individuals with criminal re-
cords").
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individuals.55 Specifically, Title VII makes it "unlawful" for an
employer "to fail or refuse to hire" an individual based on "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."56 The federal system,
therefore, does not expressly shield ex-convicts from employment
discrimination by giving them protected-class status.
1. Disparate Impact Analysis
Because "criminal conviction record" is not among the classifi-
cations explicitly protected by Title VII, ex-convicts cannot use
that status as a basis for claiming employment discrimination.
Instead, the plaintiff must show that an employer's facially neu-
tral practice regarding job applicants with criminal records had a
"disparate impact" on a class that is protected.
5 7
In a Title VII claim, the plaintiff must first prove that an em-
ployment practice results in a disparate impact on one of the pro-
tected classes. If the plaintiff meets that burden, the burden
shifts to the employer, who can invalidate the claim by showing
that the disputed practice served a "business necessity."" If the
employer can show that a legitimate business necessity is served
by its policy, the plaintiff cannot prevail in a disparate impact
claim.
2. Title VII Case Law
Federal courts have occasionally found that an employer's
practice regarding the denial of applicants with criminal arrest or
conviction records were unlawful under Title VII. In Gregory v.
Litton Systems, Inc., the Ninth Circuit affirmed a decision by
the United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia," which held that an employment practice excluding any
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
56. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
57. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)
("The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity.").
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); Todd, supra note 14, at 739 (explaining that an
example of a legitimate "business necessity" might be a police department that maintains
"minimum height, weight, and strength requirements" for its employees, which may have
a disparate impact on women as a protected class, but could serve the business necessity
of employee safety).
59. 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
60. Id. at 632.
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person with "a number of arrests" on his or her record was unlaw-
ful under Title VII. 61 The district court reasoned that the practice
had "the foreseeable effect of denying black applicants an equal
opportunity for employment. [Elven if it appears, on its face, to be
racially neutral."62 Additionally, the employer did not demon-
strate a legitimate business necessity for "continuing to ask pro-
spective employees about their arrest records."63
Three years later, the Eighth Circuit came to a similar conclu-
sion in Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.64 The court held
that the railroad's practice of eliminating from the applicant pool
prospective employees who had been convicted of any crime other
than a traffic offense was unlawful because it resulted in a dispa-
rate impact on black applicants, and the railroad did not show a
business necessity to justify its practice.65 The court rationalized
that "a sweeping disqualification for employment resting solely on
past behavior can violate Title VII where that employment prac-
tice has a disproportionate racial impact and rests upon a tenu-
ous or insubstantial basis."66
Despite the success of the plaintiffs in Gregory and Green, the
burden on plaintiffs in Title VII disparate impact cases is often
difficult to meet because they 'must offer statistical evidence of a
kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question
has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions be-
cause of their membership in a protected group."'67 Even if statis-
tical disparities do exist, employment practices that eliminate
applicants based on their criminal records can often be justified
as a business necessity.
61. Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970). This case in-
volved an employment questionnaire that inquired about arrest records, not conviction
records. The district court recognized that "information concerning a prospective em-
ployee's record of arrests without convictions[ ] is irrelevant to his suitability or qualifica-
tion for employment," but noted that the employer should be able to inquire about "the
prosecution and trial of any prospective employee, even if the proceeding eventually re-
sulted in an acquittal." Id.
62. Id.
63. 472 F.2d at 632.
64. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
65. See id. at 1292, 1295, 1298.
66. Id. at 1296.
67. Foxworth v. Pa. State Police, 402 F. Supp. 2d 523, 534 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (quoting
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)). However, statistical
analysis is not always required in disparate impact cases. See Proving a Discrimination
Case, 3 Emp. Discrimination Coordinator (West) § 136:46 (2007).
1074 [Vol. 41:1063
DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL
In 2005, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania examined a Pennsylvania State Police em-
ployment practice that automatically disqualified cadet appli-
cants who had engaged in "criminal behavior."" The court found
insufficient evidence that the automatic disqualification practice
was the reason for the "broad racial disparity" in the police work-
force demonstrated by the plaintiffs statistics.69 Even if the
causal link had been established, the court reasoned, automatic
disqualification on the basis of criminal behavior was "almost cer-
tainly ... justified by business necessity," specifically "ensuring
both public safety and that police officers do not disregard, nor
are perceived as disregarding, the law.""°
Although it is possible for an ex-convict to prevail under the
federal protection of Title VII, it certainly is not easy. Moreover,
many ex-convicts do not fit into a class that is protected under Ti-
tle VII, rendering them unable to bring a disparate impact
claim.71 Thus, Title VII's disparate impact theory does not pro-
vide a feasible alternative system of protection for ex-convicts
who have no protection under a state statute.
III. PONTICAS V. KM.S. IWESTMENTS AND
THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT HIRING
Section 213 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency recognizes
negligent hiring liability.7 2 It states, "A person conducting an ac-
tivity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for
harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless...
in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in
work involving risk of harm to others."73 Accordingly, the em-
68. See Foxworth, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (explaining that "criminal behavior" resulted
in automatic disqualification for applicants, "regardless of whether the individual was ar-
rested or convicted").
69. See id. at 534-35.
70. Id. at 535-36.
71. See Todd, supra note 14, at 741 n.77.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958).
73. Id. The tort of negligent hiring is different in scope from the doctrine of respondeat
superior. As the Supreme Court of Virginia has explained, under the theory of "respondeat
superior, an employer is vicariously liable for an employee's tortious acts committed
within the scope of the employment." J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 372 S.E.2d
391, 394 (Va. 1988) (quoting Cindy M. Haerle, Minnesota Developments, Employer Liabil-
ity for the Criminal Acts of Employees Under Negligent Hiring Theory: Ponticas v. K.M.S.
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ployer has a duty to exercise "the care which a prudent man
would take in selecting the person for the business in hand."74
The landmark 1983 Supreme Court of Minnesota decision, Pon-
ticas v. KM.S. Investments,75 logically and thoroughly analyzed
negligent hiring liability, and should act as a model for courts
seeking to provide guidance for employers during the hiring proc-
ess.
A. The Facts
Ponticas involved a female tenant of an apartment complex
who was violently raped by the apartment manager of the com-
plex. 76 The rapist, Dennis Graffice, had been employed in that ca-
pacity for just over a month.77 Graffice had a "passkey" that al-
lowed him entry into more than 198 apartment units, all of which
he supervised.78
On his employment application, Graffice stated that he had
been convicted of traffic crimes only.79 In reality, Graffice had an
extensive criminal record, including convictions for burglary and
receiving stolen property in California, and armed robbery and
burglary in Colorado, all within the previous five years.80 He had
also been fired from a job as a driver for a school bus company for
drinking on the job." The person who hired Graffice for the
apartment manager position interviewed Graffice and his wife
and checked their credit but was unable to contact his references
because there was no phone number for either listed reference
Investments, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1306 (1984)). Negligent hiring, on the other hand,
does not predicate an employer's liability upon the scope of employment; instead, it ex-
poses employers to liability based upon their own negligent action of hiring an unfit per-
son. Therefore, negligent hiring allows plaintiffs to recover while the "'scope of employ-
ment' limitation previously protected employers from liability" under respondeat superior.
Id. (quoting Haerle, supra).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 cmt. d (1958).
75. 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
76. See id. at 909.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 910.
80. See id. at 909. Graffice spent four-and-a-half months in jail for the California of-
fense in 1974, then moved to Colorado where he received another prison sentence for simi-
lar offenses in that state. See id. He was released in June 1977 and hired one year later as
a resident manager, the position at issue. See id.
81. Id.
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(who turned out to be Graffice's sister and mother).,2 The em-
ployer also did not conduct a criminal background check on Graf-
fice. s3 When the employer's first choice employee for the position
backed out, she offered the position to the Graffices, who "agreed
and were hired without further investigation."'
B. The Decision
According to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the tort of negli-
gent hiring imposes upon an employer "the duty to exercise rea-
sonable care in view of all the circumstances in hiring individuals
who, because of the employment, may pose a threat of injury to
members of the public." 5 The court articulated the standard for
liability as based on the employer's placing of "a person with
known propensities, or propensities which should have been dis-
covered by reasonable investigation, in an employment position in
which, because of the circumstances of the employment, it should
have been foreseeable that the hired individual posed a threat of




The Minnesota court has a broader view of foreseeability than
Virginia courts have shown in negligent hiring decisions. As a
general rule, the Minnesota court stated, "We have often held
that negligence is not to be determined by whether the particular
injury was foreseeable."' Here, the court concluded that a jury
could find "that it was reasonably foreseeable that a person with
a history of offenses of violence could commit another violent
crime, notwithstanding the history would not have shown him to
ever have committed the particular type of offense." 9 Unlike Vir-
82. Id. at 910.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 911.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 909.
88. Id. at 912.
89. Id.
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ginia courts, this court did not condition the employer's liability
on strict foreseeability. 90
2. Reasonable Investigation
The court continued its informative decision by considering
whether the employer breached its duty of reasonable investiga-
tion.91 It explained, "Although an employer will not be held liable
for failure to discover information about the employee's incompe-
tence that could not have been discovered by reasonable investi-
gation, the issue is whether the employer did make a reasonable
investigation."9 2 The extent of an investigation should be "directly
related to the severity of risk third parties are subjected to by an
incompetent employee."93 The court clarified:
Although only slight care might suffice in the hiring of a yardman, a
worker on a production line, or other types of employment where the
employee would not constitute a high risk of injury to third persons,
"a very different series of steps are justified if an employee is to be
sent, after hours, to work for protracted periods in the apartment of
a young woman tenant."
9 4
Accordingly, because Graffice had a "passkey permitting admit-
tance to living quarters of tenants, the employer has the duty to
use reasonable care to investigate his competency and reliability
prior to employment."95 The court concluded that a jury could find
that the employer did not reasonably investigate Graffice's refer-
ences or background, and that "such investigation would have
alerted an employer making a reasonable investigation to make
further checks of possible criminal-record and a history of having
committed violent crimes."96
Despite concluding that the employer in this case did not meet
its duty, the court made it clear that there is never an absolute
duty as a matter of law to check a potential employee's criminal
background, even if the employee's position would put him or her
90. Compare id., with Stansfield v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 50 Va. Cir. 318, 319
(1999).
91. Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 913.
92. Id. at 912-13 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 913.
94. Id. (quoting Kendall v. Gore Props., 236 F.2d 673, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1956)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 914.
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in regular contact with the public.97 What is required is that an
employer make "adequate inquiry or otherwise ha[ve] a reasona-
bly sufficient basis to conclude the employee is reliable and fit for
the job."9" The court's explanation of the appropriate scope of a
reasonable investigation gives employers sufficient guidance to
make informed decisions about hiring people with criminal re-
cords, and encourages employers to be thorough in their investi-
gation of potential employees.
3. Public Policy Rationale
It is evident that the Minnesota court is an advocate of the re-
habilitation of ex-convicts. The court eloquently stated the ra-
tionale for its decision:
There are many persons in Minnesota who have prior criminal re-
cords but who are now good citizens and competent and reliable em-
ployees. Were we to hold that an employer can never hire a person
with a criminal record at the risk of later being held liable for the
employee's assault, it would offend our civilized concept that society
must make a reasonable effort to rehabilitate those who have erred
so they can be assimilated into the community. Moreover, a rule
mandating an independent criminal history investigation would
counter the many worthwhile efforts of individuals, organizations
and employers to aid former offenders to re-establish good citizen-
ship, the sine qua non of which is gainful and productive employ-
ment. 
99
This reluctance to require criminal background checks in all
circumstances demonstrates the court's faith in the criminal jus-
tice system and in rehabilitating ex-convicts, which can benefit
the public by reducing recidivism. At the same time, the looser
foreseeability requirement and more defined reasonable investi-
gation standard in Ponticas can protect the public from employees
who may pose a threat to third parties in certain circumstances.
97. Id. at 913.
98. Id. In other words, "[Iliability of an employer is not to be predicated solely on fail-
ure to investigate criminal history of an applicant, but rather, in the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the hiring, whether the employer exercised reasonable care." Id.
99. Id.
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IV. NEGLIGENT HIRING LAW IN VIRGINIA
Although "Virginia has long recognized the tort of negligent
hiring,"' '° courts recognize that "Virginia law is very sparse on
this issue."' Virginia courts have analyzed negligent hiring li-
ability in various ways. In Simmons v. Baltimore Orioles, Inc.," °2
the United States District Court for the Western District of Vir-
ginia stated that negligent hiring "conditions liability on the em-
ployer's knowledge that the employee's past actions strongly sug-
gest that he is unfit for a job which involves an unreasonable risk
of harm to others."103 That statement, described as the "Simmons
test," was expanded by a Virginia circuit court in Doe v. Bruton
Parish Church."°4 Specifically, the court stated, "[T]he definition
of negligent hiring is placing a person in an employment situation
involving an unreasonable risk of harm to others, when the em-
ployer knew or should have known that person was unfit for the
job."'
10 5
In a more recent case, Interim Personnel of Central Virginia,
Inc. v. Messer, 06 the Supreme Court of Virginia explained:
Liability for negligent hiring is based upon an employer's failure to
exercise reasonable care in placing an individual with known pro-
pensities, or propensities that should have been discovered by rea-
sonable investigation, in an employment position in which, due to
the circumstances of the employment, it should have been foresee-
able that the hired individual posed a threat of injury to others. 1
07
Thus, the court's language includes both reasonable investiga-
tion and foreseeability standards. However, the term "reasonable
investigation" remains undefined and unexplained in Virginia
case law. The holdings in the following Virginia cases suggest
courts are dodging the issue of what kind of investigation is or is
not reasonable in a given situation.' The courts have not in-
100. J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 372 S.E.2d 391, 393 (Va. 1988).
101. Hott v. VDO Yazaki Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1114, 1129 (W.D. Va. 1996) (citation omit-
ted).
102. 712 F. Supp. 79 (W.D. Va. 1989).
103. Id. at 81 (citing Victory Tabernacle, 372 S.E.2d at 394).
104. No. 7977, 1997 WL 33575565 (Va. Cir. July 10, 1997).
105. Id. at *9.
106. 559 S.E.2d 704 (Va. 2002).
107. Id. at 707 (citing Se. Apartments Mgmt. v. Jackman, 513 S.E.2d 395, 397 (Va.
1999)).
108. By contrast, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina explained in White v. Consoli-
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structed employers on the extent of the effort they should make to
investigate a potential employee's background, especially his or
her criminal background, and have not conveyed how employers
should proceed with hiring decisions once an investigation has
been made. Instead, they focus on the foreseeability of the em-
ployee's crime; that is, the connection between the current crime
and the employee's previous actions or convictions. 109
While Virginia courts have articulated a standard for negligent
hiring liability similar to the Ponticas standard,11 ° Virginia im-
poses a strict foreseeability requirement, and a Virginia court
likely would have reached a different, and arguably unfair, result.
Based on the decisions discussed in the next section, a Virginia
court probably would have adopted the appellant's arguments in
Ponticas and quickly concluded that even if the employer had
"discovered Graffice's criminal record," it would not be liable since
the precise injury was not foreseeable."' In other words, the court
would have most likely stopped its analysis at foreseeability and
held that, although the prior convictions included violent crimes
such as armed robbery and burglary, the employer was not liable
since the new offense was a violent sexual assault."2
A. Negligent Hiring Cases in Virginia
Cases in Virginia assessing liability for negligent hiring have
predictable results because an employer has only been held liable
for this tort in a few extreme circumstances.' 3 In most cases,
dated Planning, Inc. what the employer should have discovered in a reasonable investiga-
tion. 603 S.E.2d 147 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). The plaintiff claimed that the employer
"[flail[ed] to properly investigate the background of [the employee] prior to allowing him to
handle customer accounts, when such an investigation reasonably would have revealed his
improprieties." Id. at 155. The Court agreed with the plaintiff that because the employee
had "engage[ed] in similar illegal activity since about 1992" and had been fired from his
previous job for such conduct, the employer should have discovered the employee's unfit-
ness for the particular job if it had 'conducted a reasonable investigation prior to hiring
him." Id.
109. See, e.g., Stansfield v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 50 Va. Cir. 318, 319 (1999)
(noting that none of the employee's previous crimes were related to his current crime).
110. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Virginia has directly quoted the negligent hiring
liability standard as set forth in Ponticas. See, e.g., Se. Apartments Mgmt. v. Jackman,
513 S.E.2d 395, 397 (Va. 1999).
111. Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 912. This argument was rejected by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota. See id. at 913.
112. Id. at 912.
113. See, e.g., J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394 (Va. 1988)
(holding the employer liable for negligent hiring when its employee, a convicted child mo-
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there was no employer liability because the employer was not
aware of a potential employee's propensity for violence or other
dangerous activity 114 and because there was no direct connection
between the nature of the prior conviction and the exact injury to
the plaintiff.1 ' The question, then, is when the employer should
have been aware of those propensities through reasonable inves-
tigation and what analysis the employer should apply if prior
convictions or propensities are discovered. Virginia courts have
left both questions unanswered.
This section will examine a selection of Virginia negligent hir-
ing cases and consider the factors that triggered the courts' deci-
sions.
1. Cases in Which Employers in Virginia Were Not Liable for
Negligent Hiring
Stansfield v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.16 represents a fairly
typical example of a Virginia court determining that an employer
was not negligent when he unknowingly hired a person with a
criminal conviction record. The employee, Miles, had driven the
plaintiff to and from her home in his capacity as a courtesy van
driver for Goodyear.' 17 He returned about four months later and
broke into the plaintiffs residence, whereupon he "raped and
forcibly sodomized" her.1 ' In response to a question on his em-
ployment application about whether he had been convicted of a
crime within the past ten years, Miles only indicated that he had
one "controlled dangerous substance" conviction." 9 In fact, Miles
had several other convictions, including "three counts of robbery
with a deadly weapon and three counts of the use of a handgun in
lester, assaulted a young girl); Davis v. Merrill, 112 S.E. 628, 632 (Va. 1922) (finding the
employer liable for negligence when an employee with a history of dangerous behavior
shot at a car after arguing with the driver).
114. See, e.g., Stansfield, 50 Va. Cir. at 319 (concluding that the employer could not
have discovered the employee's propensity for sexual violence even if it had conducted a
reasonable investigation).
115. See, e.g., Interim Pers. of Cent. Va. v. Messer, 559 S.E.2d 704, 708 (Va. 2002)
("[T]he mere fact that [the employee] had been convicted twice of DUI... would not place
a reasonable employer on notice or make it foreseeable that [the employee] would steal a
truck.").
116. 50 Va. Cir. 318 (1999).
117. Id. at 318. Driving a courtesy van was just one of Miles's duties. Id. The court did
not explain further what his job entailed.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 319.
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the commission of a felony or crime of violence, in addition to the
drug sentence noted."
120
In making its decision that Miles's employer should not be li-
able for hiring him, the court mentioned the "reasonable investi-
gation" standard, holding that nothing which "should have been
discovered by reasonable investigation" suggested Miles would
commit a sexual assault. 21 However, the court avoided an expla-
nation of what a reasonable investigation would have been, im-
plying that it was irrelevant because "[n] one of the convictions...
against Miles were for sexual offenses that would put an em-
ployer on notice that Miles would be likely to commit sexual as-
saults."22 The court thus adopted a strict foreseeability standard
when it opined that the employer was not liable since the exact
crime committed was not foreseeable. Therefore, even if the em-
ployer had discovered Miles's past convictions, it is likely that he
still would have escaped liability under this rule.
The same year Stansfield was decided, the Supreme Court of
Virginia came to a similar-though perhaps more defensible-
conclusion in Southeast Apartments Management v. Jackman.1
23
In this case, a female tenant of an apartment complex was mo-
lested in her apartment in the early hours of the morning by
Douglas Turner, the maintenance supervisor of the complex.
124
Turner was hired two months earlier by the landlord and given a
master key to some of the apartments. 125 He stated on his job ap-
plication that he had only committed traffic violations and had
never engaged in the listed criminal behaviors. 126 He was hired
after the resident manager conducted a background check, but
not a criminal records check. 127 The court stated that the man-
ager did not have a duty to conduct such a record check "in the
exercise of reasonable care."12 Turner's criminal records check
would have revealed that he wrote bad checks when he was
120. Id. Miles was released from prison on parole on those convictions less than two
years before the assault took place. See id. at 318-19.
121. Id. at 319.
122. Id.
123. 513 S.E.2d 395 (Va. 1999).
124. See id. at 396. Turner's duties included maintaining the apartment utilities and
grounds, and "being 'on call 24 hours a day.'" Id.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 397.
127. Id. at 396.
128. Id. at 397.
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twenty years old.129 As in Stansfield, the court here held that
"[e]ven if the owner had learned of these petty offenses, it would
not have been alerted to the fact that Turner would engage in
criminal sexual activity."' 3 ° In other words, the employer was not
put "on notice that its hiring of Turner might reasonably lead to a
pre-dawn assault on the tenant." '131 The logic of the court's deci-
sion not to hold the employer liable is clear since writing bad
checks does not make a sexual assault foreseeable, but the court
avoided explaining what kind of investigative care would have
been reasonable. The foreseeability of the crime committed was
again the main factor in the court's decisionmaking process.
In Messer, the Supreme Court of Virginia focused on whether it
was foreseeable that the hiring of the employee at issue would re-
sult in an unreasonable risk to a third person.'32 Ricky Edward
East was employed by Interim Personnel ("Interim"), a staffing
agency, and assigned to the University of Virginia ("UVA")
Alumni Association as a "Part-time Building Assistant."'33 In No-
vember 1998, East stole a pickup truck from the UVA Alumni As-
sociation, drove it while intoxicated, and injured the plaintiff
when he crashed into her vehicle.' 34 East had falsely represented
his criminal history on his employment application by indicating
that he had only been convicted of "child support" violations, and
stating that he possessed a valid driver's license.'35 Interim did
not check his criminal background or his DMV record, nor did it
ask to see a copy of his driver's license. 136 In fact, East had twice
been "convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants
(DUI)," and consequently his driver's license was suspended.1
37
He had not paid the resulting fines nor "attend[ed] ordered alco-
129. Id.
130. Id. at 398.
131. Id.
132. See Interim Pers. of Cent. Va. v. Messer, 559 S.E.2d 704, 707 (Va. 2002) (citing Se.
Apartments Mgmt. v. Jackman, 513 S.E.2d 395, 397 (Va. 1999)).
133. See id. at 705-06.
134. Id. at 705. The incident occurred during the week of Thanksgiving, when East had
been given a key to the Alumni Association Building because his supervisor was out of
town. Id. at 707. On the day of the accident, the building was not open for business. Id.
135. See id. at 706. Additionally, when asked on the application to list his "work skills,"
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hol counseling"13 and had been declared an habitual offender by
the Department of Motor Vehicles.' 39
The court determined that because East had "intentionally
concealed" his previous convictions from Interim, his employer
did not have "actual knowledge" of East's reckless propensities. 4 0
The question then became whether the employer "should have
discovered these propensities by reasonable investigation" given
the nature of the part-time, mostly clerical position.' The court
did not come to a decision on that issue, but instead stated, with-
out explanation, that it would assume the employer should have
discovered East's past convictions "in the exercise of reasonable
care."' 42 The crux of the court's decision, however, was based on
the foreseeability of the injury to the plaintiff by East.' The
court held that even if Interim had been aware of East's previous
DUI convictions, driver's license suspension, and habitual of-
fender status, it was not foreseeable that East would steal a com-
pany truck, operate it while intoxicated, and "cause an acci-
dent."'44 Therefore, Interim was not liable for negligent hiring. 4 '
The reasoning in Messer further illustrates Virginia courts' nar-
row view of foreseeability.
2. Rare Cases: Employers in Virginia Held Liable for Negligent
Hiring
One of the earliest decisions to hold an employer liable for neg-
ligently hiring an employee was the 1922 case Davis v. Merrill.'46
In Davis, a passenger in an automobile was shot and killed by a
gateman, Branch Ford, at a railroad crossing. 4 ' After Ford ar-
gued with the driver, he angrily raised the gates so the car could
cross, and then fired three shots into the back of the car. 48 The
138. Id.
139. Id.




144. Id. Despite its holding, the court stated in its discussion of general negligence that
in order to impose liability, "the precise injury need not be foreseen by a defendant." Id.
145. See id. at 708-09.
146. 112 S.E. 628 (Va. 1922).
147. Id. at 629.
148. Id. A hypothetical fact pattern equivalent to that in Davis is used as an example
in section 213 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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Supreme Court of Virginia considered the question of negligent
hiring by Ford's employer, specifically: "Was the defendant re-
sponsible for the employment of an incompetent and dangerous
person for gateman when it employed Ford, and did it know, or
could it by the exercise of ordinary care have known, that he was
an incompetent and dangerous person to be intrusted [sic] with
such duties?"149
The record revealed that Ford had previously been employed by
the same railroad company before he was discharged for drunk-
enness, that he had been "known in police circles in Norfolk as a
common drunkard," and "was easily incensed and would get into
a tantrum or become dangerously angry on slight provocation."
150
The court concluded that no one investigated Ford's previous
work record, habits, or general fitness for the job, but given his
propensities, if the employer had investigated or made an inquiry
with the police in Norfolk, "he would probably not have given
[Ford] the position." 5'
The standard used in Davis to hold the defendant liable for
negligently employing an improper person for the job suggested
there was something in Ford's record that, if known by the em-
ployer, would have deterred it from hiring Ford because the na-
ture of the job and the past violations were closely related.'52
Davis, therefore, seems to discourage employers from hiring an
individual who has anything in his or her background that would
make him or her an undesirable employee for a certain position if
it involves direct contact with the public. A criminal conviction,
even more so than a violent temper, might provide grounds for an
employer's refusal to hire.
In the 1988 case J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church,5' the
Supreme Court of Virginia reached the conclusion that there was
AGENCY § 213 cmt. d, illus. 3 (1958).
149. 112 S.E. at 631. Note that the Supreme Court of Virginia was known in 1922 as
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
150. Id. Note that Davis involves previous behavioral issues and a prior work record
with the same company. It does not involve prior criminal convictions. See id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 631. To justify its conclusion, the court cited a Supreme Court of Georgia
decision that stated, "[T]he railroad company employed him knowing his infirmity; and
that, of course, subjects the company to the consequences .... Their employment of an
improper person to come in contact with the public as their agent would be gross miscon-
duct." Id. at 632 (quoting Christian v. Columbus & R.R. Co., 7 S.E. 216, 217 (Ga. 1888)).
153. 372 S.E.2d 391 (Va. 1988).
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sufficient evidence to hold the defendant church liable for negli-
gent hiring.1"4 This case involved a church employee, Charles
Ladison, who "repeatedly raped and sexually assaulted" a ten-
year-old girl, both at the church and in other locations.1" Ladison
"had recently been convicted of aggravated sexual assault on a
young girl,... was on probation for this offense, and ... a condi-
tion of his probation was that he not be involved with children."'56
The court agreed with the plaintiff that when the church "hired
Ladison it knew, or should have known," of his recent conviction
and the conditions of his probation. 1 7 Nevertheless, he "was hired
and entrusted with duties that encouraged him to come freely
into contact with children" and he was given a master key to all
the church's doors. 15
8
The foreseeability of the employee's crimes in Victory Taberna-
cle does not require any imagination. The court stated, "[T]he
very thing that allegedly should have been foreseen in this case is
that the employee would commit a violent act upon a child."'
59
The liability of the church for hiring such an improper person for
this particular position is understandable because of the ex-
tremely close connection between the nature of the employee's
convictions and the duties associated with the job. Still, the court
does not provide any instruction to employers about the scope of a
reasonable investigation, nor does it articulate how employers
should analyze the results of their investigations.
3. Summary of Virginia Cases
The analyses and holdings in these five cases focus on the fore-
seeability of the crime committed by comparing the previous con-
viction to the current offense. This type of analysis by itself can
lead to disparate and unfair results. In addition, Virginia courts
do not give any guidance as to when the employers should have
taken more steps to become aware of the employees' past actions
or criminal records. 60 The case law seems to tell employers that if
154. See id. at 394




159. Id. at 394.
160. For an example of a recent decision that does discuss the scope of an employer's
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they do not discover a potential employee's criminal record, they
will be absolved from liability unless the crime the employee
commits during his employment is the exact crime for which he
was previously convicted.' 61
B. The Current State of Virginia Negligent Hiring Case Law and
Suggested Improvements
1. Virginia Rewards Employers Who Use a "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" Philosophy
Because negligent hiring liability in Virginia hinges on
whether the hired employee's crime was foreseeable given the
employer's knowledge of his pre-employment actions, employers
may avoid gaining that knowledge by intentionally declining to
investigate an applicant's criminal background.'62 Although the
tort includes constructive knowledge and reasonable investiga-
tion requirements, the scope of those requirements is indetermi-
nate in Virginia. However, it has been noted that a reasonable in-
vestigation "does not generally require a criminal background
check."'63 Accordingly, the court in Messer stated that "[m]ere
proof of the failure to investigate a potential employee's back-
ground is not sufficient to establish an employer's liability for
negligent hiring."'64 Therefore, an employer who wants to avoid
liability "has every reason to keep itself from being fully in-
formed." 6 ' If an employer in Virginia does not know about an ap-
duty to investigate, see Nielsen v. Archdiocese of Denver, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Colo.
2006). The court explained:
The scope of the employer's duty in exercising reasonable care. . . depends on
the employee's anticipated degree of contact with other persons in carrying
out the duties of employment. The requisite degree of care increases, and
may require expanded inquiry into the employee's background, when the em-
ployer expects the employee to have frequent contact with the public ....
Id. at 1184-85.
161. Other jurisdictions take a different stance. See, e.g., Remediation Res., Inc. v.
Balding, 635 S.E.2d 332, 335 (Ga. App. 2006) ("[I]t is not necessary that the employer
'should have contemplated or even be able to anticipate the particular consequences which
ensued, or the precise injuries sustained by the plaintiff.'" (quoting Munroe v. Universal
Health Servs. Inc., 596 S.E.2d 604, 606 (Ga. 2004))).
162. See Gerlach, supra note 15, at 982.
163. Id. at 991.
164. Interim Pers. of Cent. Va. v. Messer, 559 S.E.2d 704, 707 (Va. 2002) (citing Majo-
rana v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 539 S.E.2d 426, 431 (Va. 2000)).
165. Gerlach, supra note 15, at 991.
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plicant's propensity for actions that impose a dangerous risk on
others, then he probably will not be held liable for negligent hir-
ing unless the employee commits the same crime. Indeed, "most
jurisdictions reward the employer for his or her ignorance."1 66
Employment applications often ask whether an applicant has
been convicted of a crime other than a traffic offense, 167 and can
be an effective tool for employers who want to avoid liability.
168
Applicants who answer honestly on their applications that they
have a prior criminal conviction other than a traffic offense are
often automatically eliminated from the applicant pool, because
an employer then has knowledge of that background, which he or
she may fear could lead to negligent hiring liability if the em-
ployee injures a third party. 169 These truthful applicants might be
interested in rehabilitating and becoming productive members of
society, 7 ° but unfortunately, they are less likely to obtain em-
ployment in states like Virginia that lack guidelines or anti-
discrimination legislation to protect them.
In the absence of that protection, ex-convicts, aware of the
stigma attached to them when seeking employment, often conceal
the truth about their convictions on job applications. It is these
dishonest applicants who are more likely to be hired because em-
ployers simply take their word and because they are not required
to make a deeper inquiry into their criminal history.' 7 ' The lack
of explanation by Virginia courts as to what constitutes a "rea-
sonable investigation" perpetuates this problem. Hence, if an em-
ployer is "'reasonably unaware' of an employee's violent propensi-
ties," he or she will most likely not be held liable for that
employee's actions.'72
166. Todd, supra note 14, at 755-56. But see Schecter v. Merchs. Home Delivery, Inc.,
892 A.2d 415, 432 (D.C. 2006) (finding "sufficient evidence of negligent hiring" where the
employer hired "Mr. Brown, an individual with a record for burglary and theft, to remove
personal property from customers' homes when it had no knowledge of his background"
(emphasis added)).
167. See, e.g., Messer, 559 S.E.2d at 706.
168. See Gerlach, supra note 15, at 991-92.
169. See Todd, supra note 14, at 756.
170. See Gerlach, supra note 15, at 991.
171. See id.
172. Todd, supra note 14, at 755.
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2. Virginia's Negligent Hiring Case Law Could Improve with
Better Analyses and Guidelines from the Courts
Virginia case law ignores the question of reasonable investiga-
tion, often stopping the case analyses with strict foreseeability.
Virginia should soften its foreseeability requirement and imple-
ment uniform standards for judging potential employees' past
convictions. Such guidelines will help employers make informed,
individual assessments of potential employees without discourag-
ing them from checking criminal records. Virginia's negligent hir-
ing law would improve with decisions that help minimize dis-
crimination against ex-convicts, by telling employers when a
potential employee's criminal record matters and by setting forth
factors for employers to use in individualized assessments of job
applicants. These improvements would benefit public safety by
helping to reduce recidivism through rehabilitation and by keep-
ing potentially dangerous persons out of jobs in which they may
pose a serious risk to the public.
V. VIRGINIA SHOULD ENACT ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION
To PROTECT Ex-CONVICTS AND THE PUBLIC
Title VII does not adequately protect ex-convicts who feel they
have suffered from discriminatory employment or hiring prac-
tices;173 yet, Virginia law does not provide them with an opportu-
nity to challenge those practices.
Virginia's negligent hiring law does not afford ex-convicts the
protection against employment discrimination that they deserve,
nor does it encourage employers to investigate potential employ-
ees' past actions in order to protect the public. 174 If an employer is
aware of a potential employee's status as an ex-convict, he or she
may simply refuse to hire that applicant solely on those
grounds.' 75 Ex-convicts in Virginia have no effective remedy if
such discrimination occurs. 176 If Virginia legislators truly believe
that employment can combat recidivism, they should formulate
an anti-discrimination statute that protects ex-convicts; thus giv-
173. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
174. See text accompanying supra note 33; supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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ing an employer who complies with the law protection from liabil-
ity for negligent hiring.
The ideal statute would: (1) protect against discrimination in
both public and private employment; (2) only allow employers to
consider prior convictions that have at least "some type of ra-
tional relationship to the employment being sought;" 177 and (3)
outline the minimum set of factors to guide employers in deter-
mining whether the conviction is closely enough related to the
employment in order to exclude the applicant. 
171
It is crucial for employers to consider not just whether a convic-
tion exists on an applicant's record but also the nature of the par-
ticular offense. About half of the prisoners released in Virginia in
2002 had committed nonviolent crimes.179 Most of the nonviolent
offenses were those against property. 18 Violent offenders and
drug offenders each made up approximately twenty-five percent
of the released prison population.8 ' Employers may not be as
hesitant to hire nonviolent offenders, but they first need to be
aware of the type of offense committed, rather than the mere ex-
istence of a conviction.
An applicant's employment history might also be relevant to an
employer's analysis. In Virginia, a large majority of the released
prisoners had some previous work experience.1 12 When an ex-
convict has work experience prior to his jail or prison term, it
might be beneficial for an employer to use a reference from the
previous employer in his or her assessment of the job candidate.
There are numerous factors contributing to an ex-offender's abil-
ity to perform a job in a position where he or she is not a threat to
the public. It is up to the employer to discover those characteris-
tics, but without guidelines or directives from the state, employ-
ers might not bother making individual assessments.
A key motivation for enacting anti-discrimination legislation is
that it would "[i]nsulate employers who comply with relevant
standards against liability for negligent hiring.... [because they]
may be more open to hiring people with criminal records if their
177. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 6.
178. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753 (Consol. 2006).
179. KEEGAN & SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 12.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 19.
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liability is limited." 1 3 The risks that some people might believe
are involved with a policy to eliminate discrimination based on a
criminal conviction record are outweighed by the public benefit in
helping ex-convicts achieve gainful employment.8 4 The hope is
that when employers become less likely to discriminate against
ex-convicts, the public policy goal of reducing recidivism and aid-
ing ex-prisoners in their reentry into society will become easier to
achieve.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although certain ex-convicts have no business being employed
in particular positions, there is a compelling public safety interest
of reducing recidivism by discouraging discrimination against
them in employment. The rights of ex-convicts should be balanced
against the rights of the employers who hire them. Currently,
Virginia courts favor employers by utilizing a strict foreseeability
standard in their analyses of negligent hiring liability.' 5 In addi-
tion, because Virginia case law does not inform employers about
when or how to investigate criminal records, 86 many employers
will continue to use a "don't ask, don't tell" philosophy. Because of
the lack of guidelines in case law, the Virginia legislature should
enact an anti-discrimination statute like that of Connecticut or
New York. If employers are given rules to follow regarding how to
make individualized assessments of ex-convicts, they can be
shielded from negligent hiring liability and ideally will be less
likely to discriminate against ex-convicts. The vicious circle of
discrimination and recidivism can be reversed with guidance from
the courts and proper legislation.
Nancy B. Sasser
183. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 7.
184. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (noting evidence that employment
reduces recidivism among ex-convicts).
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